Groups and information disclosure: Olson and Putnam Hypotheses. by Yamamura, Eiji
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Groups and information disclosure:
Olson and Putnam Hypotheses.
Eiji Yamamura
1. November 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34628/
MPRA Paper No. 34628, posted 10. November 2011 15:24 UTC
1 
 
Groups and information disclosure: Olson and Putnam 
Hypotheses. 
 
 
 
Abstract. There is controversy between Putnam and Olson concerning the role of groups. 
Putnam argued that small groups contribute to economic growth, whereas Olson asserted that 
small groups hamper economic growth through rent-seeking behavior. Since the end of the 1990s 
in Japan, there has been a remarkable rise in the rate of enactment of public information-disclosure 
ordinances by local governments. This paper uses the panel data of Japan to compare the effects of 
Putnam-type horizontally structured groups and Olson-type vertically structured groups on 
government information disclosures. The Arellano-Bond type dynamic panel model is employed to 
control for unobserved fixed effects and endogeneity bias. The major findings are as follows: (1) the 
Putnam-type group has a positive influence on information disclosure; (2) the Olson-type group has 
a detrimental effect on information disclosure. These findings support both the Putnam and Olson 
hypotheses. The characteristics of a particular group should be considered carefully when the 
influence of that group is examined.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There are two conflicting views on the role of private associations in economic 
development. The classic work of Olson (1982) asserted that associations have a 
tendency to act as special interest groups that lobby for preferential policy at the 
expense of the rest of society. The typical organization represents a narrow segment of 
society and has little or no incentive to make any significant sacrifices for the interests 
of society as a whole. “The organizations are…therefore overwhelmingly oriented to 
struggle over the distribution of income and wealth rather than to the production of 
additional output.” (Olson 1982, p.44). Organizations that engage in rent seeking can be 
considered distributional coalitions. These organizations and associations lead to 
government failure and therefore hamper economic growth. In contrast to Olson‟s 
assertion, Putnam (1993) shed light on the positive role played by associations. 
“Membership in horizontally ordered groups (like sports clubs, cooperatives, mutual aid 
societies, cultural associations, and voluntary unions) should be positively associated 
with good government.” (Putnam 1993, p.175). 1  Thus, associations make a 
contribution in preventing government failure, resulting in economic growth. 
The influence of groups seems to vary with each group‟s goals and activities, which 
are different between Olson- and Putnam-type groups. Previous works concerning the 
Olson-Putnam controversy have focused mainly on the impact that types of groups have 
on trust and economic growth (Knack 2003; Pena Lopez & Sanchez Santos 2007)2. Few 
researchers have explored the relationship between Olson- or Putnam-type groups and 
government failure. Groups appear to influence the process of approving public policy, 
and so the aim of the public policy adopted is thought to depend on the degree of 
political power of the group. It is thus necessary to investigate the effects that groups 
exert on policy choice and institutional policy. Putnam-type groups are considered a 
kind of social capital. Social capital induces members of society to take collective action 
by preventing free riders and then plays an important role in forming public goods 
(Bouma et al., 2008; Hayami 2001). To take an example, information is considered 
important for not only markets but also governments to function well (Belsey and 
Burgess 2002). However, if information can be obtained only at a cost, citizens are likely 
to spend nothing on collecting it if its benefits are not greater than the cost. The rational 
ignorance of citizens leads to their preferences not being reflected in policies if the cost 
                                                   
1 Putnam also argued that “membership rates in hierarchically ordered 
organizations…should be negatively associated with good government” (Putnam 1993, 
p.175), which is not incongruent with Olson‟s view. 
2 Knack (2003) also examined the effect of group characteristics on economic growth.  
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of access to information is high (Downs 1957; Tullock 1967). A lack of critical citizens as 
a result of rational ignorance seems to lead to the welfare loss of the whole society. Laws 
and ordinances allowing citizens access to government information are important 
because the cost of accessing information is low, and so ignorance becomes irrational. 
This improves the welfare for citizens. Laws, such as those relating to information 
disclosure, are considered public goods if they enable citizens to access information at no 
cost. The initial fixed cost to enact a law is high in the short run, while the total cost of 
obtaining information becomes sufficiently low in the long run once the law has been 
enacted because the marginal cost of information is very small. The problem is who 
incurs the cost when the supply of public goods is considered. Such a situation can be 
theoretically described as “the game of chicken” (Mueller 2003, pp. 16-18). The optimal 
solution in the game requires some sort of formal or tacit agreement to cooperate. 
Therefore, cooperation and collective action among citizens are required to enact the law. 
The Putnam-type horizontally structured group enhances cooperation and collective 
action because its members are likely to agree to divide equally the costs and benefits. 
In other words, members of Putnam-type organizations have equivalent status and 
power; they reduce the coordination costs in providing public goods. 
Contrary to the above conjecture, information asymmetry between citizens and 
government is considered one of the reasons politicians, bureaucrats, and Olson-type 
special interest groups can seek their own benefits at the expense of other citizens. 
Assuming citizens can acquire sufficient information about the government relating to, 
for instance, the provision of public services or subsidies, citizens can criticize the 
corrupt behavior of politicians and bureaucrats, leading to increased benefits for the 
citizens. However, special interest groups are thought to hamper information disclosure 
since this would be detrimental to the vested interests of its members. However, this 
argument ignores the positive externality from the spread of information. If information 
disclosure improves efficiency and leads to economic growth, the returns from such 
disclosure become high. In the long run, information disclosure results in large benefits 
for the whole of society, including the members of various groups. Even if there is a 
long-run benefit from information disclosure, Olson-type groups are thought to be 
against information disclosure when the short-run benefit from information asymmetry 
is sufficiently great.  
The net benefit of information disclosure is thought to be different between Olson- 
and Putnam-type groups. If this holds true, the actions taken by Olson- and 
Putnam-type groups are also different. To test this, empirical analysis is required. In 
Japan, it has been observed that since the 1990s, an increasing number of local 
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governments have come to enact public information-disclosure ordinances for the 
purpose of assuring fair governance, ensuring that government activity has become 
more transparent and enhancing citizens‟ participation and local autonomy (Uga 2001). 
The enactment of information-disclosure ordinances seems to reduce the likelihood of 
government failure. As in other countries, special-interest groups exist in Japan and 
operate for special-interest beneficiaries (Doi & Ihori 2002). In addition, communities 
are historically rooted in a group responsibility system in Japan. Hence, Putnam-type 
groups exist in communities. Therefore, the effects of Putnam- and Olson-type groups 
on the enactment of information-disclosure ordinances can be examined in Japan as an 
ideal environment to compare the roles of Putnam- and Olson-type groups in political 
decision-making.  
This paper examines the effect of Olson- and Putnam-type groups on the enactment 
of public disclosure ordinances to investigate the Putnam and Olson hypotheses. The 
related literature is reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 briefly overviews the disclosure of 
local government information in Japan. Section 4 explains the data and methods used. 
Section 5 discusses the results of the estimations. The final section offers concluding 
observations. 
 
2. Review of related literature and hypothesis. 
 
2.1 Related literature. 
As argued by Putnam (1993), the structure of groups is important when their function 
is considered. Putnam-type groups are characterized by a horizontal structure while 
Olson-type groups are distinguished by a vertical structure. Apart from structure, Pena 
Lopez and Sanchez Santos (2007) pointed out other features of groups that lead to 
different socioeconomic outcomes. According to Pena Lopez and Sanchez Santos (2007), 
the extent to which the group is open to the rest of society is a key factor. 
Groups can be regarded as interpersonal networks (e.g., Annen 2001, 2003). Bonding 
social capital is associated with a closed network, while bridging social capital entails 
an open network. Put differently, the former encompasses people with a similar 
background and particularistic interest, while the latter brings people with a different 
social background into contact (Paxton, 2002). Olson-type groups are characterized by 
bonding social capital, whereas Putnam-type groups are distinguished by bridging 
social capital. Hence, members of Olson-type groups are inclined to cooperate only in 
rent-seeking, which results in a decrease in social welfare. On the other hand, 
Putnam-type groups are apt to cooperate in providing public goods, which results in 
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positive externality for the rest of society.  
Putnam (2000) argued that trust formed an element in social capital. In line with the 
distinction between bridging and bonding social capital, trust is categorized into 
generalized and particularized types, and this difference has been emphasized (Uslaner 
2002; Bjørnskov, C. 2006)3. As Uslaner (2002, pp. 26−27) noted, “The central idea 
distinguishing generalized from particularized trust is how inclusive your moral 
community is.” People with generalized trust have positive views toward both their own 
in-group and out-groups. In contrast, people with particularized trust have positive 
views of their own in-group but a negative attitude toward groups to which they do not 
belong. Generalized trust can be extended to strangers. Putnam-type groups are 
thought to be based on generalized trust. Conversely, particularized trust may be 
restricted to a tightly knitted personal network. Olson-type groups are considered to be 
based on particularized trust.  
Information disclosure plays an important role in reducing the information 
asymmetry between government and citizens in the political decision process. The 
preferences of citizens are reflected in policy when information about the government is 
provided by the mass media (Belsey and Burgess 2002). This is because government 
transparency increases the incentive for elected officials to respond to citizens' needs, 
rather than those of a vested-interest group. Furthermore, the mass media improve 
government efficiency (Bruns and Himmler 2011). The effects of government 
transparency have been examined (e.g., Alt et al. 2006; Benito and Bastida, 2009). Alt et 
al. (2006) used OECD data to suggest that a higher degree of fiscal transparency is 
associated with lower public debt and deficits. By using cross-country data, Benito and 
Bastida (2009) presented evidence that politicians are less likely to use fiscal deficits to 
achieve opportunistic goals when the information relating to budgets is publicly 
disclosed.  
Institutions are thought to play a critical role in reducing information asymmetry. 
The Right to Information Act came into effect on October 12, 2005 in India. The act 
ensures that citizens have secure access to information under the control of public 
authorities. Bhattacharyya & Jha (2009) found that this act and economic growth 
reduced corruption in India. Islam (2006) used the existence of freedom-of-information 
acts and the length of time they were in existence to measure the transparency of 
governments. Key findings of Islam‟s (2006) study based on cross-country data from 199 
nations were that more transparent countries achieve better governance as measured 
                                                   
3 Banfield (1958) provided a similar argument based on the case of a Southern Italian 
Village. 
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by various indexes, such as “governance effectiveness,” “voice and accountability,” 
“regulatory burden,” and “perception of corruption.” In contrast, Escaleras et al. (2010) 
used panel data obtained from 128 countries during the period 1984–2003 and found 
that enactment of freedom-of-information acts caused the degree of corruption to 
deteriorate in developing countries. Hence, the effect of information disclosure on 
corruption is open to discussion. There is a possibility of reverse causality, whereby 
economic conditions affect government transparency. Alt et al. (2006) attempted to 
ascertain the determinants of fiscal transparency in the United States. Using panel 
data, they found that political competition and power sharing produced fiscal 
transparency. What is more, past fiscal conditions affect the level of transparency (Alt et 
al. 2006).  
 
2.2. Testable hypothesis 
Putnam (1993) argued that groups characterized by a horizontal structure can be 
viewed as a source of generalized trust and lead to governmental efficiency. Public 
information-disclosure ordinances lead to an increase in the welfare of citizens and so to 
the mutual benefit of group members. “Groups that engage in little or no distributional 
lobbying…may tend to build trust and cooperative habits” (Knack 2003, 342). 
Furthermore, Putnam-type groups are not closed to the rest of society and thus may be 
considered an element of bridging social capital. If this holds true, the members of such 
groups are likely to participate in collective action, resulting in an increase of benefits 
for the whole society. That is, horizontally structured groups lead to a positive 
externality on nonmembers. Compared with Olson-type groups, such as business 
associations, the gains from rent-seeking activity are less likely to exceed the cost for 
Putnam-type groups, such as sports clubs, mutual aid societies, cultural associations, 
and voluntary unions. Information disclosure may not reduce the benefits from 
information asymmetry between government and citizens for members of Putnam-type 
groups. The benefits of information disclosure are thus greater for members of 
Putnam-type groups than loss of information disclosure. These considerations lead to 
the advancement of Hypothesis 1: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Putnam-type groups enhance the disclosure of public information by 
governments.  
 
It has been noted that lobbying activity by special interest groups results in 
governmental inefficiency and numerous budget deficits (Doi & Ihori 2002; Doi & Ihori 
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2009, Ch.7)4. Local governments can acquire an amount of information that is distinctly 
greater than that available to the citizenry. Owing to such information asymmetry 
between governments and citizens, politicians and bureaucrats are likely to place 
higher priority on their own profits than on citizens‟ welfare, which leads to various 
undesirable outcomes for society as a whole. Official information-disclosure ordinances 
enable citizens to collect information regarding governmental activity. Once citizens are 
able to access such information, they are more inclined to criticize policies that advance 
politicians‟ and bureaucrats‟ self-interest than before. As a result, budget allocations 
have become more efficient, which results in an increase in citizens‟ welfare. On the 
other hand, special interest groups lose the vested interest for their members through 
rent-seeking activity. That is, thanks to the disclosure of public information by 
governments, benefits for the whole of society increase whereas the vested interests of 
special interest groups are reduced. Members of these groups seem to be against 
information disclosure even if the benefit for the whole of society causes an increase in 
benefit for members of their particular group through positive externality in the long 
run. This is because Olson-type groups are closed to the rest of society and hence should 
be considered an element of bonding social capital. Hence, special interest groups have a 
strong incentive to prevent public information-disclosure ordinances from being enacted. 
Members of the group take collective action against the ordinance. Thus, Hypothesis 2 
is proposed as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Olson-type groups impede the disclosure of public information by 
governments.  
 
3. Overview of information disclosure in Japan  
 
In Japan, the central government enacted the information-disclosure law in 1999, 
which was about 30 years after the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act in the 
United States in 1967. Rather than the central government, local governments in Japan 
at the level of towns and villages have played a leading role in disclosing public 
information. In 1982, the town of Kanayama in northeastern Japan became the first to 
enact an information-disclosure ordinance (Muroi 1999). Information-disclosure 
ordinances signify the regulations of a particular local government providing residents 
                                                   
4 “Agriculture-related public capital, fishing ports, flood-control measures, and forest 
conservation have been over-funded as a result of the lobbying activities of local-interest 
groups” (Doi & Ihori 2009, p.181). 
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the right to request the disclosure of information possessed by that body. Figure 1 
indicates that the rate of enactment of information-disclosure ordinances rose 
drastically from 1998 to 2004. The rate of enactment was about 0.2 in 1998 and reached 
0.9 in 2004 5 , 6 . The disclosure of the public information ordinances ensures local 
government accountability in towns, village, and municipalities. Information-disclosure 
ordinances are based on the right to know (Muroi, 1999).  
Information-disclosure ordinances enable citizens to identify fraudulent interests on 
the part of politicians, bureaucrats, or private firms. There are various kinds of corrupt 
uses of public funds, cheating, and collusion. Prior to the mid-1990s, 
information-disclosure systems were not well developed in most of Japan‟s local 
governments. Bureaucrats often claimed expenses for business trips that were not 
actually undertaken, but this was not disclosed to citizens. In the early 1990s, 
politicians played essentially the roles of company managers, even though politicians 
were prohibited by law from engaging in side businesses. Firms managed substantially 
by politicians frequently received orders for construction work from local governments 
(Asano, 2010). It has been widely observed that subsidies were provided recklessly to 
sectors with strong electoral leverage, and local governments spent lavishly on public 
works projects. The fact that public funds were being illicitly used was revealed by 
means of information disclosure, and the total amount of such expenditure amounted to 
4 billion yen in 1998 (Muroi 1999, p.106). Once an information-disclosure system is in 
place, the process by which, for example, suppliers of public services are appointed can 
become transparent, and the inappropriate behavior of politician can be deterred. With 
such a system, citizens are able to scrutinize the possible collusion among politicians, 
bureaucrats, and private firms. As a result, in a number of prefectures, the practice of 
local bureaucrats using public funds to entertain central bureaucrats was in principle 
abolished (Matsui 2000, p.6). The details of bureaucrats‟ business trips are now open to 
the public (Matsui 2000, p.6). Hence, information-disclosure ordinances have made a 
great contribution to improving the efficiency of local government7.  
                                                   
5 This rate would become 1 if all local governments enacted such ordinances. 
6 Since 2005, the annexation of municipalities, towns, and villages has rapidly 
increased. As a result, the number of municipalities, towns, and villages decreased to 
around 2,300 in 2005, and then to approximately 1,800 in 2009. Accordingly, the rate of 
municipalities enacting ordinances rose from 0.97 in 2005 to 0.99 in 2009. Annexation of 
municipalities is thought to be positively related to the rate of enacting ordinances. 
That is, the rate of enacting disclosure ordinances is partly affected by the annexation of 
municipalities. From 2005 to 2009, the change in the rate of enacting disclosure 
ordinances was minute. Therefore, I focus on the period of 1998–2004 in this paper. 
7 It has been found that the government‟s public information disclosure is positively 
associated with GDP growth in Japan (Yamamura 2010b). 
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As discussed above, public information-disclosure ordinances lead to the increased 
welfare of citizens. However, politicians, bureaucrats, and special interest group seem to 
lose the benefits of information asymmetry between local government and citizens. 
Hence, they are likely to oppose the disclosure of public information. In the process of 
enacting information-disclosure law, bureaucrats made an endeavor to emasculate the 
law (Tsuruoka & Asaoka 1997). 
 
 
3. Data and method 
 
3.1. Data  
Municipalities, towns, and villages are the lowest level of local government. From 
1998 to 2004, there were about 3,200 local governments in the municipalities, towns, 
and villages in Japan‟s 47 prefectures8; the number of local governments is thus 
approximately 68 per prefecture.  
Proxy variable data for Olson-type groups were collected from the Establishment and 
Enterprise Census provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
Statistics Bureau. The Establishment and Enterprise Census contains data about 
various categories of organizations. In the present paper, proxy variables of Olson 
groups are (1) cooperative associations9 and (2) political and business organizations. 
This is because these organizations are established in part to act as special interest 
groups to lobby for preferential policies. The number of cooperative associations per 
population is denoted as OG1, and the number of political and business organizations 
per population as OG2. These groups are organized for special interest purposes. OG1 
and OG2 are incorporated to examine the effects of Olson-type groups on government 
information disclosure.  
Community fire-fighting teams originated in the Edo period (1600–1867), and they 
have continued to the present (Goto 2001). Community fire-fighting teams, which are 
informal institutions, are still required today in part because of the relative scarcity of 
fire stations, which are formal institutions. Such teams play an important role not only 
in combating fires but also in generating social capital through interpersonal 
communication in a cooperative protective activity against disasters in general (Goto 
                                                   
8 A Japanese prefecture is roughly the administrative equivalent of an American state 
or Canadian province. 
9 In the Establishment and Enterprise Census, cooperative associations include (a) 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing cooperative associations and (b) business cooperative 
associations. 
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2001). Members of such teams regularly patrol within their community to ensure that 
precautions are taken against fires and other disasters. Community fire-fighting teams 
clearly make a contribution to reducing the damage caused by natural disasters in 
Japan (Yamamura 2010 a). The structure of community fire-fighting teams can be 
regarded as horizontal, bringing together members of equivalent status and power.  
Furthermore, the participation in the teams is voluntary. Therefore, a community 
fire-fighting team is a kind of voluntary association. However, the team undertakes 
precautions against fires and disasters in the community, which includes not only the 
team members, but also other community inhabitants. This role is equivalent to that 
played by a civil association, which is a Putnam-type group. “Civil associations 
contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic government, it is argued, both 
because of their „internal‟ effects on individual members and because of their „external‟ 
effects on the wider polity” (Putnam 1993, p.89). Thus, the number of fire-fighting 
teams per population is used as the proxy variable of Putnam-type groups, represented 
by PG. The numbers of fire-fighting teams is derived from Index Publishing (2006). 
GDP per capita and number of immigrants comes from the Asahi Shimbun (2008). 
The unemployment rate was obtained from the Web site of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications Statistics Bureau. The population census (1990, 2000), as 
published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, provided data about 
the numbers of people who graduated from universities over the past 10 years; for the 
period 1990–2000, the data for 1998 to 2000 were generated by interpolations based on 
the assumption of constantly changing rates between 1990 and 2000. The data between 
2001 and 2004 were calculated by adding the annual number of people who graduated 
from university between 2001 and 2004. The annual data between 2001 and 2004 were 
collected from the Basic Report for Schools (2001–2004) published by the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. The number of people who 
graduated from university and population data were used to calculate the rate of 
university graduation. Definitions and basic statistics of variables used in this paper 
are presented in Table 1. 
Table 2 reveals that PG is positively related to OG1 and OG2. I interpret this as 
suggesting that Olson-type groups are more likely to exist in places where Putnam-type 
groups exist. It follows from this that the determinants of forming groups are similar 
regardless of features of the groups. Furthermore, MOBIL (number of migrants from 
other prefectures per population) is negatively associated with OG1, OG2, and PG, 
which implies that both Olson-type and Putnam-type groups are less likely to exist in 
places where population mobility is more conspicuous. Groups enhancing collective 
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action can form more easily when the social network is tighter. 
 
3.2. Methods 
 
To examine the hypotheses raised previously, this paper uses the Arellano-Bond type 
dynamic panel model (Arellano 2003). The estimated function takes the following form: 
DINF it=1 DINF i(t-1) + 2OG1it + 3OG2 it + 4PGit +５MOBILit +6UNEMPit + 
7GDPit+7EDUit+ui+εit, 
 
where the dependent variable is DINFit in prefecture i, for year t. ‟s represent the 
regression parameters. The lag of dependent variable is included as an independent 
variable. ui represents the unobservable fixed effects of prefecture i. The effect of ui is 
controlled for by the dynamic panel model. εit represents the error term. The structure 
of the data covers 6 years for 47 prefectures. However, the dynamic panel model takes 
the first difference, and DINF it lagged two periods or more are used as instruments, 
which led to 47 observations for two years being discarded. Year dummies are included 
to capture macroeconomic factors. 
The effects of key variables in examining Hypotheses 1 and 2 are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 creates the expectation that the coefficient sign of PG will be positive. In 
contrast, Hypothesis 2 anticipates that the coefficient signs of OG1 and OG2 will be 
negative. Putnam defined social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, 
norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated action” (Putnam 1993, p.167). According to Putnam (2000), frequent movers 
have weaker ties within the community, and so mobile communities seem to have less 
interactivity with their neighbors than do more stable ones. Put differently, the more 
mobile a community is, the weaker its internal network becomes. Hence, MOBIL, 
denoting the number of migrants from other prefecture, can be considered a proxy for 
the decay of social capital. Social network, one of the features of social capital, appears 
to enhance collective action within a community (Putnam 1993, 2000). Hence, MOBIL 
can be considered to be negatively related to the formation not only of Putnam-type but 
also Olson-type groups. This presumption can be supported by the negative correlation 
between MOBIL and OG1 (OG2 or PG) exhibited in Table 2. Once the effect of these 
groups is controlled for by incorporating OG1, OG2, and PG, MOBIL can be considered 
to capture the other effects of population mobility. In more mobile societies, the 
long-term benefits from the residential place diminish because residents are more likely 
to move to other locations. Therefore, residents in more mobile societies are less likely to 
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improve the conditions in their places of residence. This reduces the incentive to require 
enactment of public information disclosure by local governments even if such disclosure 
would improve the residential situation. MOBIL is thus predicted to be negative.  
Control variables such as UNEMP, GDP, and HC are incorporated to capture the 
economic condition. Unemployed people appear to be discontent with the performance of 
local governments because their unemployment is partly caused by the ineffectiveness 
of such governments. Hence, UNEMP is likely to require information disclosure and so 
is positive. Highly educated people can interpret the government‟s information more 
effectively and so can make use of the information to improve the government, resulting 
in an increase in welfare. Therefore, highly educated people are more inclined to require 
information disclosure. The sign of HC (rate of university graduation) is anticipated to 
be positive. The greater the GDP, the more sensitive citizens are to ways of using the tax 
collected from them because the amount of per capita tax is greater. If this holds true, 
citizens in a country with a high GDP are more willing to obtain information about 
public finances and so call for information disclosure. GDP is thus predicted to take a 
positive sign. 
 
3.3. Endogeneity bias 
 GDP and unemployment rate seem to affect the decision making of local 
governments about the enactment of information disclosure. Conversely, there is the 
possibility of reverse causality, whereby the enactment of information disclosure 
influences the GDP and unemployment rate. Government public information disclosure 
is believed to make the government allocate resources more efficiently, thereby 
increasing GDP and reducing the unemployment rate10. In addition, people will tend to 
move to a place where they can earn a higher income. Information disclosure possibly 
affects the income level and therefore has an influence on MOBIL. If this holds true, the 
causality between enactment of information disclosure and GDP (UNEMP or MOBIL) 
should be considered ambiguous. Hence, the estimation results appear to suffer from 
endogeneity bias. GDP, UNEMP, and MOBIL are treated as endogenous variables in the 
dynamic panel model for the purpose of controlling for the estimation bias11. I use the 
level of endogenous variable lagged two periods or more as additional instrumental 
variables (Arellano 2003, p.168). 
 
                                                   
10 By using OECD data, Alt & Lassen (2006) provided the evidence that fiscal 
transparency decreases debt accumulation. 
11 Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) used the dynamic panel model to alleviate endogenous bias 
by treating various independent variables as endogenous.  
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4. Results 
 
The results of the dynamic panel model are shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5. All 
estimations control for the exogenous macrolevel shock by including year dummies as 
independent variables. As presented in Table 2, the correlation coefficient between OG1 
and OG2 is 0.66, suggesting a multicollinearity between OG1 and OG2. With the aim of 
alleviating the effect of multicollinearity, in addition to the full model including OG1 
and OG2, I also present alternative specifications that do not simultaneously include 
OG1 and OG2. In column 1 of Tables 3 and 4, and columns 1 and 4 of Table 5, the results 
of the full model are reported. In the remaining columns of Tables 3, 4, and 5, the 
results of alternative specifications are presented. The results of baseline estimates, 
which treat all independent variables as exogenous, are exhibited in Table 3. The 
results of estimations that treat MOBIL, UNEMP, and GDP as endogenous are shown 
in Table 4. Table 5 presents the results of estimates that treat all independent variables 
as endogenous.  
Tables 3, 4, and 5 provide the results of Sargan‟s over-identification test and 
second-order serial correlation test (Arellano 2003). These tests are necessary to check 
the validity of the estimation results in the dynamic panel model. The null hypothesis of 
Sargan‟s over-identification test is that the instrumental variables do not correlate with 
the residuals. If the hypothesis is not rejected, the instrumental variables are valid. 
Furthermore, the test for the null hypothesis (that there is no second-order serial 
correlation with disturbances in the first-difference equation) is important because the 
estimator is consistent when there is no second-order serial correlation. Tables 3, 4, and 
5 show that both hypotheses are not rejected in all estimations, suggesting that the 
estimation results are valid.  
In all columns of Table 3, the coefficients of OG1 and OG2 are, as anticipated, 
negative, while the coefficient of PG is positive. Also, OG2 and PG are statistically 
significant at the 1% level, OG1 is statistically significant at the 10% level in column 2. 
This is consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. Furthermore, the absolute values of the PG 
coefficient are approximately 10, which is about 8–10 times greater than those of OG1 
and OG2. That is, the Putnam effect is distinctly greater than the Olson effect. A 
significant negative value for MOBIL in all columns is in accordance with expectations. 
For control variables, consistent with the prediction, GDP is positive, while being 
statistically significant in all columns. Other control variables are not statistically 
significant.  
The results presented in Table 4 are consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2: the 
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coefficients of OG1 and OG2 are negative, whereas that of PG is positive in all columns. 
In particular, OG2 and PG continue to be statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
absolute values of the PG coefficient are from 6.86 to 8.53, which are smaller than those 
in Table 3. Conversely, both absolute values of OG1 and OG2 are greater than those in 
Table 3. Hence, the difference in effect of Putnam‟s and Olson‟s groups becomes smaller 
after controlling for endogeneity bias in economic variables. MOBIL continues to be 
negative and statistically significant. The results of control variables are not stable, and 
so their effects are ambiguous. The results of alternative specifications presented in 
Table 5 are similar to those in Table4, suggesting that the results of estimations are 
robust. 
The combined results of Tables 3, 4, and 5 strongly support Hypotheses 1 and 2, 
which implies that both Putnam- and Olson-group effects on enacting public 
information disclosure are observable at the same time.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Olson (1982) argued that a social group is apt to lobby for preferential policy for its 
members at the expense of the rest of society. This in part causes failures on the part of 
government. In contrast, Putnam (1993) asserted that a horizontally structured group 
fosters institutional success, reducing the likelihood of government failure. What is 
more, Olson-type groups are thought to be characterized by bonding social capital and 
so are closed to the rest of society. Conversely, Putnam-type groups are distinguished by 
bridging social capital and so are open to the rest of society. The conflict between 
Putnam‟s and Olson‟s ideas has not been sufficiently examined. This paper aims to 
examine the effects of Putnam- and Olson-type groups on government quality by using 
the panel dataset of Japan. 
In Japan, since the end of 1990s, local governments have actively enhanced 
information disclosure. Hence, there has been a remarkable rise in the rate of 
enactment of information-disclosure ordinances by local governments: various closed 
information areas can be accessed by citizens if they request them to be opened. When 
information-disclosure ordinances are enacted, special interest groups lobby for 
preferential policy and engage in rent seeking. This is because citizens are likely to 
criticize the government when it favors the special interest group at the expense of 
other citizens‟ benefits. Hence, the Olson-type group has an incentive to prevent such 
ordinances from being enacted. On the other hand, the Putnam-type group is thought to 
prefer information disclosure because this makes a contribution to improving 
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government transparency, leading to benefits to the whole of society. In enacting 
information-disclosure ordinances, both Olson- and Putnam-type groups are thus 
anticipated to play a critical role. Investigating these groups‟ effects on ordinance 
enactment is thought to be an appropriate empirical case study for exploring the Olson 
and Putnam hypotheses. 
I used the Arellano-Bond type dynamic panel model to control for unobserved fixed 
effects and endogeneity bias. The major findings are summarized as follows: (1) the 
Putnam-type group has a positive influence on information disclosure; (2) the 
Olson-type group has a detrimental effect on information disclosure. Compared with the 
existing literature examining the effects of Putnam- and Olson-type groups on trust and 
growth (Knack 2003; Pena Lopez & Sanchez Santos 2007), the primary contribution of 
this paper is twofold. First, the present study provides a definite understanding of the 
effect of groups on the choice of public policy. Second, it elucidates the opposite effects of 
Putnam- and Olson-type groups on policy choice. This might in part be because of the 
difference of degree to which the group is open to the rest of society. Bridging-group 
members and other citizens are important to increase the net expected benefit for the 
whole of society, rather than the net expected benefit only for a particular group. This is 
in line with the argument that generalized trust is more important than particularized 
trust for economic growth (Uslaner 2002). The critical issue is how to increase the 
positive externality of bridging social capital and generalized trust and how to decrease 
the negative externality of bonding social capital and particularized trust.  
This paper did not compare the influences between Putnam- and Olson-type groups 
regarding various political and economic issues, such as public spending, deficits, and 
government size, nor does it present a theoretical framework on which to base results. 
These issues should be researched to explore the questions of how and to what extent 
Putnam- and Olson-type groups have a different role in public economic issues. Finally, 
the sample size was small in this study, and larger samples are recommended in future. 
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Fig.1 Rates of enactment by municipalities of government information-disclosure 
ordinances. 
1 The rate would become 1 if all local governments enacted the ordinances. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and basic statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
DINF 
 
Rates of municipalities enacting government 
information-disclosure ordinances 
(municipalities enacting ordinances/all municipalities) 
0.63 0.32 
OG1  
 
Number of cooperative associations per population  
(number of cooperative associations/1,000 persons) 
0.31 0.13 
OG2  
 
Number of political and business organizations per 
population. 
(number of political and business organizations /1,000 
persons) 
0.35 0.11 
PG 
 
Numbers of fire-fighting teams per population 
(number of fire-fighting teams /1,000 persons) 
0.31 0.14 
MOBIL 
 
Number of migrants from other prefectures per 
population 
(number of migrants from other prefectures /1,000 
persons) 
19.5 4.85 
UNEMP  
 
Unemployment rate (%) 4.46 1.10 
GDP  
 
GDP (in millions of yen) 3.57 0.74 
HC 
 
Rate of university graduation 0.09 0.03 
1 Data were collected from the Asahi Shimbun newspaper (2008) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Statistics 
Bureau (various years). 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix of variables used for estimation 
 DISCINF 
 
OG1 OG2 PG MOBIL UNEMP GDP HC 
DINFt-1 
 
1.00        
OG1 t 
 
-0.21 1.00       
OG2 t 
 
-0.06 0.66 1.00      
PGt 
 
-0.10 0.67 0.38 1.00     
MOBILt 
 
-0.05 -0.48 -0.23 -0.47 1.00    
UNEMP t 
 
0.09 -0.47 -0.07 -0.28 0.18 1.00   
GDP t 
 
0.21 -0.28 0.0003 0.43 0.36 -0.11 1.00  
HC t 
 
0.25 -0.62 -0.44 -0.62 0.73 0.18 0.53 1.00 
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Table 3. Dynamic panel model with DISCINFt,as dependent variable  
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
DINFt-1 
 
0.67*** 
(9.28) 
0.71*** 
(10.8) 
0.66*** 
(9.02) 
OG1 t 
 
-0.84 
(-1.62) 
-0.97* 
(-1.87) 
 
OG2 t 
 
-1.23*** 
(-2.67) 
 -1.62*** 
(-3.37) 
PGt 
 
10.4*** 
(4.04) 
8.79*** 
(3.39) 
10.8*** 
(4.14) 
MOBILt 
 
-0.05*** 
(-3.39) 
-0.04*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.04*** 
(-3.30) 
UNEMP t 
 
-0.03 
(-1.09) 
-0.02 
(-0.91) 
-0.02 
(-1.04) 
GDP t 
 
20.7** 
(2.01) 
21.1** 
(2.03) 
20.4** 
(1.94) 
HC t 
 
-1.59 
(-0.85) 
-1.26 
(-0.67) 
-1.68 
(-0.94) 
Constant 
 
-1.56* 
(-1.75) 
-1.52 
(-1.56) 
-1.82** 
(-2.16) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan test 
 <P-value> 
18.2 
<0.19> 
19.0 
<0.16> 
18.6 
<0.17> 
Serial correlation 
 Second-order 
<P-value> 
-0.55 
<0.57> 
-0.55 
<0.57> 
-0.50 
<0.61> 
Observations 232 232 233 
1 Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.  
2 “Yes” signifies that year dummies are included as independent variables. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4. Dynamic panel model with endogenous variables and DISCINFt, as dependent 
variable  
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
DINFt-1 
 
0.59*** 
(20.3) 
0.61*** 
(20.6) 
0.61*** 
(26.2) 
OG1 t 
 
-1.00* 
(-1.74) 
-1.41** 
(-2.41) 
 
OG2 t 
 
-3.34*** 
(-2.76) 
 -3.86*** 
(-4.04) 
PGt 
 
8.53*** 
(4.61) 
7.72*** 
(4.83) 
6.86*** 
(4.60) 
MOBILt 
 
-0.05*** 
(-7.02) 
-0.05*** 
(-7.04) 
-0.04*** 
(-6.70) 
UNEMP t 
 
0.01 
(0.99) 
0.02 
(1.42) 
0.03* 
(2.15) 
GDP t 
 
-0.85 
(-0.13) 
11.3* 
(1.68) 
-5.19 
(-0.95) 
HC t 
 
2.07 
(1.15) 
3.77* 
(1.96) 
0.96 
(0.83) 
Constant 
 
0.17 
(0.17) 
-1.46* 
(-1.80) 
0.63 
(0.93) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Endogenous 
variables 
MOBIL 
UNEMP 
GDP 
MOBIL 
UNEMP 
GDP 
MOBIL 
UNEMP 
GDP 
Sargan test 
 <P-value> 
33.9 
<0.99> 
37.1 
<0.97> 
34.0 
<0.99> 
Serial 
correlation 
 
Second-order 
<P-value> 
-0.75 
<0.45> 
-0.93 
<0.34> 
-0.65 
<0.51> 
Observations 232 232 232 
1 Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.  
2 “Yes” signifies that year dummies are included as independent variables. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5. Dynamic panel model with endogenous variables and DISCINFt, as dependent 
variable 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
DINFt-1 
 
0.61*** 
(18.7) 
0.65*** 
(18.3) 
0.64*** 
(24.3) 
0.54*** 
(15.6) 
0.53*** 
(22.4) 
0.50*** 
(14.4) 
OG1 t 
 
-1.00* 
(-1.97) 
-1.56*** 
(-3.37) 
 -0.09 
(-0.22) 
-1.06*** 
(-2.66) 
 
OG2 t 
 
-2.08 
(-1.49) 
 -4.46*** 
(-4.03) 
-3.46*** 
(-3.15) 
 -4.78*** 
(-3.83) 
PGt 
 
12.2*** 
(4.66) 
13.4*** 
(4.91) 
15.2*** 
(7.11) 
10.2*** 
(5.74) 
10.9*** 
(4.38) 
13.2*** 
(5.99) 
MOBILt 
 
-0.04*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.04*** 
(-4.76) 
-0.05*** 
(-5.65) 
-0.03*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.03*** 
(-5.44) 
-0.04*** 
(-4.90) 
UNEMP t 
 
-0.01 
(-0.65) 
-0.01 
(-1.37) 
-0.01 
(-1.06) 
0.02 
(1.60) 
0.04*** 
(3.04) 
0.02 
(1.63) 
GDP t 
 
14.3 
(1.30) 
34.0*** 
(4.04) 
1.56 
(1.06) 
19.1* 
(2.06) 
31.2*** 
(3.31) 
11.9* 
(2.12) 
HC t 
 
-0.43 
(-0.39) 
0.28 
(0.23) 
-0.93 
(-0.83) 
-3.73* 
(-1.67) 
1.28 
(0.61) 
-2.18 
(-1.18) 
Constant 
 
-1.73* 
(-1.69) 
-3.52*** 
(-3.98) 
-1.42 
(-1.28) 
-1.24 
(-1.42) 
-3.39*** 
(-3.57) 
-1.29 
(-1.64) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogenous 
variables 
OG1 
OG2 
PG 
MOBIL 
 
OG1 
PG 
MOBIL 
 
OG2 
PG 
MOBIL 
 
OG1 
OG2 
PG 
MOBIL 
UNEMP 
GDP 
HC 
OG1 
PG 
MOBIL 
UNEMP 
GDP 
HC 
OG2 
PG 
MOBIL 
UNEMP 
GDP 
HC 
Sargan test 
 <P-value> 
27.5 
<0.99> 
29.9 
<0.99> 
27.2 
<0.99> 
35.8 
<1.00> 
34.5 
<1.00> 
32.5 
<1.00> 
Serial 
correlation 
 
Second-order 
<P-value> 
-0.74 
<0.45> 
-0.74 
<0.45> 
-0.48 
<0.62> 
-0.61 
<0.53> 
-1.18 
<0.23> 
-0.77 
<0.43> 
Observations 232 232 232 232 232 232 
1 Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.  
2 “Yes” signifies that year dummies are included as independent variables. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
